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If Franklin D. Roosevelt had not been President and if the nation 
had not been plunged into the Great Depression of the 1930's, 
action might not have been taken at that time or might have taken 
a different form. 
Arthur Altmeyer (1966, 6)' 
The unemployment compensation system of the United States is distinctive. 
Nowhere else does publicly mandated unemployment insurance (UI) contain 
the feature of experience rating, whereby firms are penalized for benefits paid 
out to their workers.2  Unlike many European systems, unemployment compen- 
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1. Altmeyer was the chair of  the Technical Board of  the Committee on Economic  Security, 
established by executive order in 1934, and was one of three members of the first Social Security 
Board, becoming its chair in 1936. 
2. Both Great Britain and Austria had once allowed for some type of experience rating at the 
trade or industry level. In Britain the original act contained a section that has been interpreted as 
a form of experience rating. It was replaced in 1920 with a provision that entire industries could 
independently manage their own unemployment insurance (UI) plans. But the operation  of the 
provision was suspended in 1921 and eliminated entirely in 1927 (Feldman and Smith 1939; Lester 
and Kidd 1939). Experience rating by industry was part of the original UI system passed in Austria 
in  1920, but it was later abandoned because labor felt it was too divisive an issue (Becker 1971, 
chap. 3). 
Even though there is no experience rating in European UI systems, many European countries 
have mandated severance pay for permanently separated workers. The system amounts to some 
experience rating, although employer taxes are not linked to unemployment benefits. They are, 
instead, a tax per worker laid off  that is usually a function of  years of  employee service with 
the firm. 
227 228  Katherine Baicker, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F.  Katz 
sation among the states has always limited duration of   benefit^.^ And no na- 
tional system in the industrialized world cedes to its states, provinces, or can- 
tons as much autonomy to  establish tax rates, set benefits, and determine 
eligibility as does that in the United States. Unemployment compensation in 
the United States is not one system; it is many. Yet, even though there are a 
multitude of systems-53  to be precise-there  is unity in several features that 
are also distinct with respect to other countries. Experience rating, a federal- 
state structure, and the limitation on benefit duration are the most obvious. 
Others include less generous benefits, a tax base equal to a small fraction of 
payroll, restrictive eligibility, and currently low take-up rates. 
The three distinctive features of the U.S. unemployment insurance system 
were intentional. Even though UI was part of the omnibus Social Security Act 
(SSA) passed in August  1935, in a time of  urgency and amidst a flurry of 
legislation, its details were well thought out. Two  of  the features-the  state 
system and the potential for experience rating-were  parts of the original fed- 
eral law and were responses to past lessons fresh in the minds of the drafters. 
The limitation on duration of benefits, incorporated into all state laws, was also 
derived from historical lesson. The law was tailored to the times but not simply 
to the depression experience. Previous decades of experience with unemploy- 
ment, in the United States and elsewhere, and with the legislative and judicial 
processes shaped the act. 
More so than any other part of the SSA, such as welfare and social security, 
the design of UI remains today that intended in the original document. Details 
have changed, to be sure. They had to, because UI is a state system and the 
states had to pass legislation to receive credit for the taxes charged their em- 
ployers. Tax rates, benefits, the tax base, eligibility, maximum duration of bene- 
fits, and coverage have all changed countless times since the late 1930s. But 
the substance of the act remains very much the same. 
The act was intended to provide unemployment benefits to those having at- 
tachment to the labor force. Under the act, the unemployed are viewed as those 
temporarily out of work, not the permanently displaced. The law contains no 
provision for retraining. UI was not a handout or welfare, for benefits were not 
to be means tested. They depend on previous earnings and work experience 
and could be of  limited duration.“ Employers were to be penalized for their 
contribution to (compensated) unemployment, and states were given an incen- 
tive to devise tax rates to accomplish that goal. Finally, the act encouraged 
3. Federal-state extended benefits for periods of  high unemployment, jointly financed by  the 
federal government through the federal unemployment tax and the states, were proposed in the 
1960s and eventually passed in 1970. Benefits, even when extended, are still limited, usually to 
13 weeks beyond the exhaustion of  regular state benefits. 
4. The act barred means testing through its definition of “compensation” as “cash benefits pay- 
able to individuals with respect to their unemployment” (Sec. 907.b). Although the act has no 
provisions for retraining and prohibits the use of UI funds for any disbursements other than UI 
compensation and administrative costs (Sec. 903.a.4). prior legislation covered placement. Passed 229  Origins and Impact of U.S. Unemployment Compensation 
states to tailor their systems to best meet the needs of their workers and firms. 
Because the substance of  the UI system has changed little with time, many 
claim that it is antiquated, particularly with regard to its lack of retraining and 
the absence of benefit eligibility for many part-year and part-time employees 
who lose their jobs (see, e.g., Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensa- 
tion [ACUC] 1996). 
Because, as we contend, today’s UI system has retained its original design, 
we can address part of  the central question of  the conference: How  did the 
establishment of  the UI system “define” or alter the economy in subsequent 
years? The answer involves observing how the UI system affected the economy 
through its particular design. We  will emphasize the distinctive features of the 
system and not its existence because some UI system, we  and most others 
believe, was destined to be establi~hed.~  But how  would the UI system have 
differed had it been passed during an era other than the Great Depression? In 
what manner are its distinctive features today, and their evolution at the state 
level, products of the period of its passage, and what difference have they made 
to the economy? 
As Arthur Altmeyer conjectures in the epigraph, had there been no Great 
Depression social insurance might not have taken the form it did in 1935. Of 
the three distinctive features of the system, it is the federal-state structure that 
would probably be different had passage been delayed. And had there not been 
a federal-state structure, it is likely that the system would not have been experi- 
ence rated, but we are less secure in this prediction. The most interesting issue 
concerns how the system functioned because of  its federal, and not national, 
character. 
We  explore various aspects of the system, two of which-the  federal-state 
structure and experience rating-are  related to the possible difference that pas- 
sage during the 1930s meant. We look at how states tailored their systems from 
the late 1940s to the 1960s in response to the needs, objectives, or simple rent- 
seeking activities of  their citizens. We  then ask whether firms in states with 
more experience rating responded to financial penalties by reducing employ- 
ment fluctuations and whether seasonality in the United States evolved any 
differently from that in Canada, which does not have experience rating, after 
both passed UI. 
in  1933, the Wagner-Peyser Act (Employment Exchange Bill) established a federal-state network 
of employment service offices to help workers in their job searches. The bill was not, however, 
intended to provide retraining. 
5.  Those who worked on the act believe that as well: “There is no question . . . that sooner or 
later the same world-wide economic, social, and political forces responsible for the emergence of 
social security programs in 125 nations would have resulted in the development  of a social security 
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7.1  Unemployment Insurance Today and Its Evolution 
7.1.1  Coverage, Eligibility, and Generosity 
We  step back, for a moment, from the questions at hand to briefly describe 
the UI system today and its evolution nationally and at the state level during 
the past 60 years. When UI was passed in 1935, the intent of the framers was 
to insure workers, with attachment to the labor force, against unemployment 
of short duration and to provide them with sufficient income to tide them over, 
but not so much as to generate serious work disincentives. That has remained 
the intent. Note, however, that the original law is extremely parsimonious in 
the details and that virtually all the features that realized the intent-those 
regarding eligibility, duration, and generosity-arose  out of state law. Cover- 
age is one of the few details in the 1935 act.6 
At  the time of  its passage, UI  covered nonagricultural, non-public-sector 
workers in firms with more than eight employees.’ In the six decades since its 
passage, coverage of those demonstrating “attachment” to the labor force has 
continued, but the act has become more inclusive in covering workers in virtu- 
ally all firms and those in public sector employment. As shown in figure 7.1, 
covered employment was 60 percent in the early 1950s and it is now 90 per- 
cent8  Thus, U.S. unemployment insurance coverage today is nearly universal 
for wage and salary employees. Some of the time-series expansion reflects in- 
creases in the statutory number of employees per firm and in the distribution 
of employees across firms. The upper line in the graph (after 1971) shows the 
influence of other changes in the law. The various jumps in that line reflect the 
inclusion of employees of nonprofits and public sector workers. 
The original intent of UI-that  it be for those attached to the labor force, of 
limited duration, and of moderate amount-was  implemented by  the various 
states and evolved over time. Attachment to the labor force is assured by eligi- 
bility requirements of two types: monetary and nonmonetary. Monetary eligi- 
bility requirements typically demand that the claimant demonstrate earnings 
in the recent past that exceed some minimum and have had employment that 
was sufficiently continuo~s.~  Claimants must also demonstrate availability for 
work and current search behavior. Unemployment must have arisen from eco- 
6. The potential for experience rating was also part of  the original law. We take up this subject 
below. 
7. Also excluded were domestic servants, employees of  nonprofits, casual laborers, those over 
age 65,  and some others (Title VIII, Sec. 81  1). Railroad workers were excluded in 1938 when they 
became covered by their own statute. 
8. In 1954 coverage was extended to firms with at least four employees. In 1970 the law was 
broadened to include employees of nonprofits, and in both 1970 and 1976 coverage was extended 
to all state and local government employees and to some agricultural workers. 
9. Monetary eligibility requirements typically have three parts and take the following form: (1) 
earnings during some base period (sum of the four or the five most recent quarters) have to exceed 
some minimum level, (2) during at least one of the quarters they have to exceed a higher level, and 
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Fig. 7.1  Proportion of the civilian labor force covered by UI, 1939-94 
Sources and Notes: U.S. Department of Labor, ETA (1996) for average monthly covered employ- 
ment. After  1971, average monthly  covered employment  for the "reimbursable"  sectors  is in- 
cluded. "Reimbursable" includes the public sector and nonprofits that do not pay taxes but receive 
coverage. U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (CEA 1996, table B-31) for civilian employment. 
Civilian employment before 1947 includes those 14  years old or older; after 1946 it includes those 
16 years old or older. 
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CovEmp 1 = (taxable covered employment)/(civilian employment). 
CovEmp2 = [all (taxable + reimbursable) covered employment]/civilian employment. Note 
that CovEmpl and CovEmp2 are the same until 1971. 
nomic reasons; quits and terminations for cause are typically invalid reasons. 
The maximum duration of  benefits is typically 26 weeks in all states today. 
Potential duration increased somewhat in the early years of  the system and 
rose to the current 26-week level by the mid-l950s.I0 
The original act, although silent on most details, did set down a legal griev- 
ance procedure, and most grievances today concern the nonmonetary aspects 
of eligibility, such as whether an employee quit or was fired. States have con- 
siderable discretion to change eligibility. Yet  it is important to realize that the 
eligibility requirements established at the very outset of  the program are, by 
and large, those in place today. The requirements may have suited the labor 
force of the  1920s and 1930s, but with a larger share of the workforce em- 
ployed part time and discontinuously,  a lower fraction of the covered workforce 
is now eligible for benefits once unemployed. 
10. Federal-state extended benefits, as part of the 1970 UI law, are triggered by  a complicated 
formula concerning both the level and the rate of change of unemployment in a state. States can 
choose whether to use a trigger based on their insured unemployment rate or  on their overall 
unemployment rate. More recently, as occurred in the 1991-93 recession, Congress has, by discre- 
tion and on an ad hoc basis, passed emergency extended benefits for the entire nation, thus by- 
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Fig. 7.2  Evolution of (UI claims/total unemployed) and (benefitdwages), 
1940-94 
Sources and  Notes: U.S.  Department of Labor, ETA (1996) for the number of UI claims, average 
weekly benefits, and the average weekly wage. CEA (1996, table B-3  1) for civilian unemployment. 
Average weekly benefits and average weekly wages are entire US.  averages. 
There are various measures of  the system's generosity. All begin with the 
legal replacement rate schedule. Most state laws, today and in the past, contain 
replacement rates in the 50-60  percent range." The ex post, actual rate can be 
computed only by using microlevel data because it requires knowing the earn- 
ings of benefit recipients.I2  A more convenient measure for the past is the aver- 
age weekly benefits of UI recipients as a fraction of the average weekly wage 
of all covered employees. As  seen in figure 7.2 (open-dot  line), this measure 
has been rather stable, nationally, from the early years of the program to the 
present.I3 
Even though the ratio of  benefits to average wages, for the entire United 
States, has been  relatively stable, growing variation across the  states has 
11. Many are instead expressed as an equivalent fraction (e.g.. 1/26) of high-quarter wages. 
12. Actual pretax replacement rates today have been computed in the 52-7  1 percent range, by 
state, with between 70 and 90 percent of recipients, by state, receiving more than 50 percent. See 
ACUC (1996,54), which calculates the rate for Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washing- 
ton, and Wisconsin using the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Gruber (1994) esti- 
mates a mean after-tax replacement rate of 58 percent for unemployed household heads during 
1969-87,  using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. He finds, in most states, average after-tax 
replacement rates of below 50 percent in 1987, when UI benefits became fully taxable under the 
federal income tax. 
13. UI benefits were not subject to federal income tax prior to 1979. The federal taxation of 
benefits was phased in from 1979 to 1987. Thus, the stability of the pretax replacement rate, as 
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Fig. 7.3  Cross-state standard deviations of (benefitdwages)  and (maximum 
benefitdwages), 194&94 
Sources and Notes:  U.S. Department of Labor, ETA (1996) for state-level data on average weekly 
UI benefit and average weekly wage. US. Department of Labor, ETA  (various years; 1996) for 
maximum weekly benefits in the case of  no dependents. 
sd rrate = standard deviation of the log (average weekly benefit/average weekly wage) or the 
standard deviation of the (log) replacement rate. sd rrmax = standard deviation of the log (maxi- 
mum weekly benefit, no dependents/average weekly wage) or the standard deviation of the (log) 
maximum replacement rate. 
emerged during the past decades, as can be seen in  figure 7.3. The bottom 
(open-dot)  line shows the standard deviation of the logarithm of the replace- 
ment rate (benefit/wage) by  state. After an  initial decline until 1956, as the 
states tinkered with their new systems, this variance measure rose and then 
remained at that higher level until the late 1970s, when it rose again (although 
it has declined recently). A second measure (also in fig. 7.3, solid-dot line),  the 
standard deviation of the log (maximum weekly benefit/average weekly wage), 
reveals considerably more upward drift. States have, over time, established 
maximum rates that differ more from each other, even though the ex post re- 
placement rates exhibit less increasing variance. 
Generosity must be tempered by  eligibility, and eligibility has fallen over 
the past 45 years.I4  We  graph a measure of eligibility in figure 7.2 (solid-dot 
line)-UI  claims as a fraction of  total national unemployment. The measure 
declines in two periods: during the early 1960s and the early 1980s. Another 
14. Hamermesh and Slesnick (1995) demonstrate that consumption has been stable in recent 
years for those receiving benefits. Thus the consumption-smoothing  mechanism of UI has not 
been altered for this group, but the group receiving benefits has changed. 234  Katherine Baicker, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F.  Katz 
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Fig. 7.4  Unemployment benefits as a fraction of GDP and the unemployment 
rate, 1948-94 
Suurces and Notes:  GDP. 1959-94,  CEA (1996, table B-l), 1946-58,  U.S. Department of Com- 
merce (1993, table 1.1, 1946-58). 
UI  Unemployment insurance benefits for 1963-94,  CEA (1996, table B-41),  1946-62,  CEA 
(1977, table B-31). Un Rate: Unemployment rate for 1948-94,  CEA (1996, table B-39). UI does 
not include supplemental benefits paid by federal funds but does include extended benefits. 
way of observing the same phenomenon is to express UI as a fraction of GDP 
and graph it against the unemployment rate, as has been done in figure 7.4.15 
The two lines of figure 7.4 are very close until the early 1980s when they drift 
farther apart. Both figures 7.2 and 7.4 reveal the declining eligibility. 
One of the puzzles addressed in the recent literature on UI is why the frac- 
tion receiving benefits has decreased. Some emphasize long-term changes in 
the structure of the labor force and the erosion of union strength (Baldwin and 
McHugh 1992; Corson and Nicholson 1988). Others claim the change is part 
of a general “race to the bottom” in social insurance as well as a product of an 
interaction between UI and federally funded programs (ACUC 1996).16  States 
have eroded UI eligibility to shift costs to programs, such as food stamps, that 
are more fully funded.I7  Thus, it appears from various indicators that the frac- 
15. UI in fig. 7.4 is total benefits paid by the states (also to federal employees, railroad workers, 
exservicemen, and veterans) not including federally funded emergency supplemental benefits. 
16. Another possible factor is the decrease in net benefits with their inclusion in taxable income. 
Anderson and Meyer (1996) find that this reduction in net benefits reduced UI take-up rates and 
can explain some of the decline in UI receipts in the 1980s. 
17. The regional distribution of the labor force matters to the aggregate take-up rate. States in 
the Northeast have high take-up rates but others, such as Texas, have low take-up rates. Blank and 
Card (1991) conclude that one-third to one-half of the decline in take-up is due to changes in the 
regional distribution of U.S. workers. Others argue that this factor is less important. Instead, they 235  Origins and Impact of U.S. Unemployment Compensation 
tion of  covered employment that is able to (or chooses to) collect UI, when 
unemployed, has declined over time. 
The size of UI in the national economy is a product of coverage, eligibility, 
generosity, and unemployment rate. Thus, it might not be an odd or unfortunate 
situation for UI to be a shrinking share of GDP. But it is curious and interesting 
that workers’ compensation (WC), the first social insurance program in the 
United States, is now considerably larger than UI. In 1960 UI was almost twice 
as large as WC, but in 1990, another nonrecessionary year, WC was almost 
twice the size of UI. Even during the 1991-93  recession, UI was a lower frac- 
tion of GDP than was WC. The WC explosion may, in part, be a product of the 
same forces that have increased all health care expenditures. Both UI and WC 
are fully funded at the state level, and thus both could have been subject to a 
race to the bottom. But if there has been such a race, it should have  eroded 
expenditures on both.’* 
7.1.2  Comparisons with Canada and Other OECD Countries 
Another means of  judging the generosity, eligibility, and coverage of  the 
U.S. system is by way of comparison. Our neighbor to the north passed a na- 
tional UI law in  1940.19 Through the early 1970s the general features of the 
U.S. and Canadian programs moved in tandem. But since then expenditures on 
the Canadian system have exploded in comparison with the United States. The 
reasons concern major legislative changes in Canada. Eligibility requirements 
were substantially reduced in 1972-just  8 weeks of  work were required to 
qualify (increased to 10-14  weeks in 1978); benefits were expanded in numer- 
ous ways-maximum  weeks and the replacement rate were increased (Green 
and Riddell 1993). In consequence, spending soared. Although further changes 
in the latter part of  the 1970s reduced the generosity of  the system, Canada 
had moved closer to the European UI model and farther away from that of the 
United States.20  In 1976 the ratio of total UI benefits in the United States to 
that in Canada was 5; it was 1.3 in 1990 (Green and Riddell 1993, table 4). 
note that as states faced budgetary pressures, they got tougher administratively and encouraged 
employers to challenge claims. Further, as the fraction of workers with unstable workforce histor- 
ies grows, so will the wedge between the total unemployment rate and the eligibility rate for UI. 
The decline of unions could also have contributed to the decrease in take-up rates if unions had 
supported workers whose claims were challenged and if they provided information on filing. 
18. One reason there could be a race to the bottom in UI but less so in WC concerns asymmetric 
information. Employers have far more information on why workers are terminated than they do 
on workers’ health status, and thus they can more credibly threaten to contest UI claims. 
19. Canada passed the Employment and Social Insurance Act in 1935, but it was deemed not 
within the realm of the federal government. A Royal Commission, set up in 1937, recommended 
a Canadian federal UI program and a constitutional amendment to allow for it. With the amend- 
ment, the passage and constitutionality of the Canadian Unemployment Insurance Act of 1940 was 
assured (Green and Riddell  1993). Interestingly, Canada has a national UI law and provincial 
minimum wages, whereas the United States has state UI laws and a national minimum wage. 
20. A recent study shows that the United States has among the least generous UI systems in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Part of the lack of generosity 
comes from the lower replacement rate in the first half-year of unemployment, and part comes 236  Katherine Baicker, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F.  Katz 
7.2  Origins of the Distinctive Features 
How did the U.S. unemployment compensation system obtain its distinctive 
features, and in what sense were they the products of  a distinctive decade? 
Were they designed to ensure passage of the act, take care of special problems 
of the day, or serve another function? Among the three features-experience 
rating, federal-state structure, and limited benefits-that  which most shaped 
the system has been its federal-state structure. A discussion of all three takes 
us deep into the history of  the subject at both the national and state levels 
and gives us a chance to explain some of the basic features of UI at its outset 
and today.21 
7.2.1 
Prior to the Great Depression, unemployment insurance was  discussed at 
both the state and national levels, but there was little pressure to pass legisla- 
tion. Massachusetts, in 1916, was the first state to introduce a UI bill, modeled 
after the 1911 British act that set up its social security and UI systems. Massa- 
chusetts was followed by New York  and Wisconsin in  1921. The Wisconsin 
bill, originally drafted in large measure by  John R. Commons, differed from 
the others by penalizing firms with higher unemployment rates, a system now 
known as experience rating and then termed  “merit rating.” The Huber (or 
Groves) bill, as it was eventually called, underwent various modifications be- 
fore becoming law in 1932. The most important change concerned the estab- 
lishment of  employer reserve accounts instead of  a state-pooled fund, with 
employer liability limited to the amount of the fund.22  The system of employer 
reserve accounts, although allowed by  the federal act and adopted by  some, 
was eventually dropped by all states. 
Seven states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Pennsyl- 
vania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin) introduced bills for compulsory systems 
of  UI before 1929, and one was introduced in Congress in  1928 (Industrial 
State Action prior to 1935 
from the absence of UI coverage after six months. The calculation also factors in assistance pro- 
grams (e.g., food stamps) applying under particular family circumstances. In the overall generosity 
measure, covering five years, the United States is third from the bottom (out of 21 countries) and 
is third or fourth from the bottom for the first year. See OECD (1994, table 8.1. p. 175). 
21. We  have borrowed heavily from, among others, Altmeyer (1966), Becker (1971), Blaustein 
(1993), Douglas (1939), Haber and Murray (1966), Industrial Relations Counselors (1934), Nelson 
(1969). Perkins (1946), Schlesinger  ([1958] 1988), Stewart (1930, 1938), and Witte (1962). Histo- 
rians are fortunate that many who crafted and drafted the legislation wrote extensive memoirs, 
although they are not always in agreement. 
22. Commons worked on the 1921 Huber bill, which contained a pooled state fund. According 
to Becker (1971), when Philip La Follette (the son of the senator) wanted to run for governor, he 
asked Paul Raushenbush and Harold Groves to help draft a UI bill. Groves, according to Becker, 
thought that employer funds, and thus full experience rating, would appear less like socialism to 
the voters. Some firms had already created their own UI funds, and with full experience rating 
there would be no cross-subsidization. The final Huber (Groves) bill is generally associated with 
Commons, although it, perhaps, should be associated more with the Commons school than with 
the man. 237  Origins and Impact of U.S. Unemployment Compensation 
Relations Counselors 1934, 72). With the onset of  the economic downturn, 
activity accelerated regarding UI legislation. Commissions to study UI were 
authorized in nine states and reported in six (California, Connecticut, Massa- 
chusetts, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin). The governor of one convened a 
conference of seven contiguous states to explore the possibility of coordinated 
action. That governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, assigned the task of organizing 
the conference to Frances Perkins, later to be his secretary of labor. Perkins, in 
turn, involved Paul Douglas in its planning. 
Douglas helped draft unemployment legislation for Ohio in  1932 that dif- 
fered in two important ways from the Wisconsin model. The Ohio plan pro- 
vided for pooled reserves at the state level, rather than employer accounts, and 
did not incorporate merit rating (although it left open the possibility of experi- 
ence rating in the future). The two systems were similar in other respects. Ben- 
efits were limited to 16 weeks in Ohio and to 10 weeks in Wisconsin. Benefits 
equaled 50 percent of weekly wages in both states but with different minimum 
and maximum levels. The tax rate was 2 percent of covered wages to be paid 
by  employers in Wisconsin but was 3 percent in Ohio, with 2 percent from 
employers and 1 percent from employees.23 
The  Commons  and  Douglas  “model”  plans-those  of  Wisconsin  and 
Ohio-reflected  opposing views of the causes of unemployment and the eco- 
nomic effects of the remedy. Commons, and his associates at the University of 
Wisconsin, believed employers had wide leeway to reduce seasonal and other 
layoffs, and thus they championed merit rating and employer reserve funds.24 
UI would be to unemployment what WC was to industrial safety. Both laws 
would penalize employers who engaged in practices that, to Commons and 
others, injured labor. 
Douglas, and his associates at the University of Chicago, saw in unemploy- 
ment compensation a means of lifting the economy out of its doldrums through 
increased purchasing power. Contrary to Commons, Douglas was unconvinced 
that a large part of unemployment was at the discretion of the employer. Em- 
ployers already had incentives to reduce unemployment and seasonal layoffs. 
A sound system based on pooled accounts, he believed, was essential to the 
automatic stabilizing role he accorded unemployment compensation. Merit 
rating could unduly penalize some firms that experienced negative shocks and 
could even exacerbate a downturn by driving such firms into bankruptcy.25 
The debates between the two  schools took place mainly  on  substantive 
23. See Industrial Relations Counselors (1934, table D) for state bills passed by  either house 
after 1929. 
24. It is not clear what market failure Commons believed was at work, other than the fact the 
firms did  not  directly take into consideration the  value  their workers placed on consumption 
smoothing. Of course, if workers were identical, those in more highly seasonal industries would 
receive a wage premium. 
25. The Commons and  Douglas models were not the only serious proposals. The American 
Association for Labor Legislation, a Progressive Era organization, drafted a compromise bill that 
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grounds, but ideological factors entered as  Each group had the ear of 
an influential segment of the committees that framed the eventual document. 
Although these differences form an intellectual backdrop for the legislative 
history of UI, they also concern the essence of the bill-national  versus state 
structure, pooled  versus firm reserves, and merit rating versus none. Both 
Douglas and Commons played major roles in devising our current UI system, 
but the final bill would more clearly bear the Commons stamp. 
In 1933, 25 states together introduced 83 bills (39 of  which were amend- 
ments). An equal number of the separate bills embraced the Douglas and Com- 
mons forms (16 each); fewer (6) espoused a compromise version. Although 
none passed any state legislature, bills in seven states passed at least one house 
(California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New  York, 
and Ohio). Wisconsin had passed a UI bill the year before that, of  course, 
embraced the Commons ~ystem.~’  The majority of the other seven state bills 
that passed one house were modeled after the Wisconsin bill. 
Of the eight state bills, all but two (Maryland and Ohio) called for individual 
employer reserves, the most extreme form of experience rating.z8  All of these 
limited employer liability to their fund amount, thus placing the unemployed 
at risk of not receiving compensation. Five of the eight states limited benefits 
to 50 percent of the weekly wage with varying maximum benefit caps, one 
used a 75 percent replacement rate (California), one 40 percent (Minnesota), 
and one had a more complicated formula (Connecticut). Several offered bene- 
fits to those employed part time. There was considerable variation in the dura- 
tion of benefits. At the lower end were Wisconsin and Massachusetts with 10 
weeks and California with 13. In the middle were New York and Ohio with 16 
weeks and Maryland with 20. At the upper end were Minnesota at 40 weeks 
and Connecticut at 46. 
As it became clear that an unemployment compensation act would be passed 
by  Congress, states deliberated their own measures more seriously. Prior to 
passage of the SSA, signed into law on 14  August 1935, five states passed their 
own legislation. Apart from Wisconsin, the list includes, in chronological order 
of passage (all in 1935), New York (April), New Hampshire (May), California 
(June), and Massachusetts (August)-a  Utah law  was  repealed and one in 
Washington was declared unconstitutional (Stewart 1938,28). New York‘s was 
the only one with a pooled fund.29 
It should be transparent, by now, that there was considerable agreement and 
26.  See, e.g., Rubinow  (1934) for a taste of  the vitriol in the debate between Douglas and 
Commons. Rubinow and Douglas were closely allied. Some of the differences are comprehensible 
to us, while others are simply not. 
27. See Blaustein (1993) and Industrial Relations Counselors (1934). 
28. Of course, compulsory employer reserves does not constitute “social insurance” but rather 
29. The California law, as passed, provided for a pooled fund but allowed firms with approved 
is compulsory “self-insurance” by firms. 
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uniformity in the state laws proposed and passed prior to the SSA. First, and 
foremost, states debated the legislation because it was believed, and with hind- 
sight rightly so, that the legislation would be state based. Second, there was 
considerable agreement concerning the benefits of merit rating, and in many 
cases, the proposal was for the most extreme form-employer  reserves. Third, 
there was considerable similarity in the details, such as limitation on benefits, 
no means testing, and the definition of eligibility. 
The content of these bills and the reports of the various commissions were 
important backdrops for discussions at the national level, which began in ear- 
nest in 1931. So too were the UI systems of the seven countries that had earlier 
passed national compulsory UI laws and the ten with subsidies to voluntary UI 
plans (Blaustein 1993, 82). 
The British UI system was passed along with other major social insurance 
in 191  1, and Germany's has existed since 1927. British experience with soaring 
unemployment in the interwar period gave rise to a widely held view,  in the 
United States and elsewhere, that unlimited benefits could have disastrous ef- 
fects. Interwar unemployment in Britain heavily influenced the limitation on 
benefits adopted by every state. 
7.2.2  Federal Action prior to Passage of the Social Security Act 
In the debate over UI at the federal level, there were many issues to be de- 
cided. Most basic was whether the system would be state or national. Next was 
whether there would be experience rating, and also whether the reserve fund 
would be  state, national, employer, or industry based. Although there were 
many other parts of the system that varied from one draft bill to another, they 
were less basic and debated less intensely. 
A UI bill was introduced into Congress in  1934. Known as the Wagner- 
Lewis bill, much of it was modeled after the Wisconsin legislation. The pro- 
posed law provided for a state system with the states having the choice of a 
pooled or an employer reserve system. Portions were drafted by Paul Raushen- 
bush, who with his wife, Elizabeth Brandeis, had been students of Commons 
at the University of Wisconsin. Raushenbush's father-in-law was Justice Bran- 
deis and the justice's role in the legislation will soon be clear. 
The most difficult problem was how the federal government could entice the 
states to pass UI legislation without endangering the bill's constitutionality,  for 
only one had done so by  1934. The answer was found in a precedent involving 
the federal estate tax. Justice Brandeis, or so a widely reported story maintains, 
devised the tax-offset plan (Blaustein  1993, 125; Schlesinger [  19581 1988, 
302). He conveyed it to his son-in-law Paul Raushenbush, who in turn incorpo- 
rated it in the Wagner-Lewis bill. The tax-offset plan was ingenious and used 
a scheme the Court had already validated. 
In  1926 the federal government, in response to Florida's elimination of its 
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but remitted credits if the state passed an estate tax. No state could then entice 
migration with the promise of no estate tax without paying a penalty. The law, 
later upheld by the Court in Florida v. Mellon (1927), provided the model for 
the federal unemployment compensation tax credit. 
Roosevelt had run in 1932 on a platform that included “unemployment and 
old-age insurance under State laws” and he did not wish to endanger the full 
legislation with the piecemeal approach represented by the proposed Wagner- 
Lewis legislation in the House and Senate. Unemployment was the gripping 
issue of the day, but Roosevelt had a wider vision of the future needs of  the 
country. Passing UI, Roosevelt suspected, would be a far easier task than pass- 
ing social security, old-age assistance, and other types of safety-net legislation. 
Thus, the answer was to bundle them in one bill. 
In June 1934 Roosevelt strategically asked that the Wagner-Lewis Bill be 
deferred and created the Committee on Economic Security (CES), with Fran- 
ces Perkins as chair, to look into all aspects of social insurance. The CES staff 
largely consisted of those with expertise and interests in the Wisconsin system, 
but their ultimate decision was based more on practicality than ideology. 
The clearest statement of what Roosevelt wanted and how the CES made its 
ultimate decision comes from the recollections of Frances Perkins. The presi- 
dent, according to Perkins, had no favorite design for UI. As governor “he had 
not made up his mind” (Perkins 1946, 107), and as president he seemed open 
to most plans.3o  Despite the fact that Roosevelt stated on 15 November 1934 
that “this part of social insurance should be a cooperative federal-state under- 
taking,” Perkins takes the credit for writing these words that have been quoted 
so often since. According to her, Roosevelt had no independent view on the 
subject and the “question was by no means settled” in November (1946, 289).31 
As the deliberations intensified, Perkins, and others on the CES, began to 
favor a strictly national UI system. But the constitutional matter was troubling 
and for good reason.32  The National Industrial Recovery Act in  May  1935 
(Schechter Poultry Corp. v.  United States) and the first Agricultural Adjust- 
ment Act (AAA) in January 1936 (United States v. Butler) would be overturned 
by the Supreme Court, The second child labor case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture 
Co.) was lost in 1922 over the use of taxing powers that were not designed to 
raise revenue, the same reasoning that would shortly bring down the AAA. 
30. Roosevelt was open to all except one. He opposed Harry Hopkins’s plan to institute a perma- 
nent work relief system, which the president regarded as constituting a permanent “dole” (Perkins 
1946,205). 
31. Altmeyer believed otherwise: “The President’s desire to rely upon the states as much as 
possible was based upon his lifelong belief in our federal form, rather than a national form, of 
government” (1966, 11). Perkins would have disagreed. 
32. In Perkins’s words: “There was one outstanding, and in my mind, determining factor, at that 
time in favor of the federal-state system. Although we thought we were on the right track in using 
the taxing power of the Federal Government, we were never quite sure whether a federal system 
of unemployment insurance would be constitutional. The Federal Government could tax. . . .  But 
could it distribute its funds on a basis of social benefit? The Attorney General’s office . . . repeat- 
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Despite the concern, the CES, according to Perkins, decided in early December 
1934 to recommend a national system.33  Only after intense lobbying by  the 
various cabinet agencies of CES members, did the CES decide, in late Decem- 
ber 1935, to recommend the federal-state system still with us today. “The Pres- 
ident knew of only part of this confusion,” recalled Perkins, “if we were agreed 
on a method, then he was for it.” “The Committee,” she believed, “must bear 
the responsibility for the pattern of unemployment insurance we have in this 
country today” (1946, 292). 
The CES was divided on experience rating, particularly whether firms could, 
by  state law, have their own reserves (as they did in Wisconsin). It ultimately 
decided to allow states to have such reserves, and that became part of the act. 
But the most important issue was the federal-state structure. In the end, the 
pragmatists won and a state system was assured containing considerable lee- 
way for state experimentation with experience rating, benefits, and eligibilit~.~~ 
To understand the long-run effects of  UI legislation we  must construct a 
counterfactual world. What changes would have brought about a different sys- 
tem in terms of the federal-state structure and experience rating? Although we 
cannot be certain, we suspect that passage just a year or two later, certainly a 
decade later, would have changed the bill considerably. 
The Court was a major hindrance but would not remain so for much longer. 
In  1937 the Court left intact the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.B. v. 
Jones and La~ghlin).~~  By  1941, even without packing the Court, Roosevelt 
had appointed seven justices, and by 1945 the entire Court had changed. A new 
era of “permissiveness” regarding government regulation began.36 
33. The Technical Board of the CES independently decided on a national system, chiefly to 
ensure unimpeded geographic mobility of workers. Perkins does not mention how their delihera- 
tions affected her views. For an opposing view to Perkins’s regarding support for a national system, 
see the essay by Thomas H. Eliot (Eliot 1961). Eliot was a member and counsel of the CES Techni- 
cal Board. 
34. Directly following the CES report, a bill, which would become the SSA, was brought to 
congressional committee. It contained UI as a state system, with the tax offset, and with compul- 
sory experience rating (for states to receive credit after reserves were sufficiently high). The House 
version of the bill removed the experience-rating feature on the grounds that it would differentiate 
among states and lead to the same problems that were feared before federal UI. That is, some 
states would have considerably lower taxes than others on particular industries or firms. The Senate 
version contained experience rating, as did the final bill. 
35. The real break came with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), which upheld a Progres- 
sive Era state minimum wage law. Although it did not directly concern New Deal legislation, West 
Coast Hotel has been interpreted as assuring the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
yet to be passed. 
36. According to Miller (1968) and many other constitutional historians, 1937 was a momentous 
turning point in Supreme Court history. The long period from Munn (1877) to Jones and Laughlin 
( 1937) was one of laissez-faire conservatism and Court-dominated legislation. “Badly wounded 
in the [Court packing] struggle, the Court, without announcement and without fanfare, dropped 
its laissez-faire stop sign and erected in its place a placard of permissiveness” (Miller 1968, 79). 
More important than the Court-packing battle, however, was the overwhelming vote for Roosevelt 
in 1936. 
Though Roosevelt lost the Court-packing battle, an act of March 1937 eventually gave him what 
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Assume for the moment that the CES had decided to back a national system, 
that the plan received overwhelming approval by  the president, and that the 
Supreme Court was no threat to the legislation. Would Congress have passed 
it? Most histories of the period emphasize the constitutionality of the proposed 
legislation, but all mention, as well, the potential problems with Congress. 
When Perkins and others on the CES were lobbied by  their colleagues after 
they decided in early December 1934 to back a national system, congressional 
approval was the major issue.37  But congressional matters were always bound up 
with those of the Court. Several years later, when the Fair Labor Standards Act 
was introduced, there was never serious discussion of having the federal gov- 
ernment compel more states to pass wage and hours laws. We will never know 
whether a national system could have passed Congress had the other stumbling 
blocks, mainly the Court, been removed, but we sense that it could have.38 
Thus, it is our belief that the federal-state structure was a product of  the 
times, particularly the threat of the Supreme  But without the federal- 
state structure, would experience rating have been incorporated into a national 
law? We  think not  but  acknowledge that  this  is the more difficult count- 
erfactual. 
Those close to Roosevelt who preferred the national system were also indi- 
viduals who did not favor experience rating, certainly not in the extreme em- 
ployer reserve form. The coincidence of  beliefs was no accident; it derived 
from economic reasoning. A state system, to many such as Douglas, would not 
be adequate during a major economic downturn and would hinder geographic 
mobility when employment shocks differed by  state. Similarly, the penalties 
of experience rating could exacerbate unemployment if  shocks differed sub- 
stantially by  industry or firm. Certain potential benefits from both the state 
~~ 
pay upon retirement. Four conservative justices left by  1941 (Devanter 1937, Sutherland  1938, 
Butler 1939, and McReynolds  1940), although four liberal ones (Cardozo 1938, Brandeis 1939, 
Stone 1941, and Hughes 1941) did as well (see Eriksson 1941). 
37. “There was grave doubt . . . that Congress would pass a law for a purely federal system” 
according to Perkins, who was recalling the results of some last-minute December interviews with 
members of Congress (Perkins 1946,292). 
38. Another question is whether UI would have been different had the Wisconsin group sup- 
ported a national system, rather than defending the components of the Wisconsin UI bill. Congress 
did vote on one national bill. The Lundeen bill, a Farmer-Labor proposal, received some 50 votes 
as an amendment to the SSA. The bill would have made UI a national program but would also 
have considerably broadened its scope, duration, and benefits. See Douglas (1939,82). 
39. Why, then, was old-age insurance (OAI) passed at the national level? First of all, it should 
be remembered that old-age assistance (OAA), as well as various other SSA programs covering 
the poor and the infirm, were left to the states. The federal government provided incentives, but 
there was no coercion. OAI, however, would have been an  extremely faulty system had it been left 
to the states, for it was a contributory program with a long time horizon for each individual. The 
movement of workers from state to state would have involved enormous complications for OAI 
(see, e.g., Eliot 1961). UI, on the other hand, was a short-run measure, as were welfare and OAA 
to some extent. The CES knew that the national character of OAI created potentially serious prob- 
lems regarding the Supreme Court, and they crafted the tax and expenditure sections of the act 
with that in mind (see Miron and Weil, chap. 9 in this volume). The point is that the CES could 
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system and experience rating were not doubted by those who came to oppose 
them. It was the net effect that mattered. 
Among those who held these views, Frances Perkins was the closest to Roo- 
sevelt. She was his secretary of labor, had headed the New York State analogue 
when Roosevelt had been governor, and was chosen by him to head the CES. 
Her views carried considerable weight, and if not for the Court, she would have 
argued strenuously for the adoption of a national UI system without experience 
rating. She made forceful arguments to Roosevelt regarding experience rating 
when the position of the Court was still being assessed. 
Perkins presented her case to Roosevelt in a most personally persuasive 
manner. The comparison between merit rating in WC and UI was often made 
by the Commons group, and Perkins reminded Roosevelt of the dangers in WC 
incentives. “A  [man] badly crippled . . . [by an industrial accident] might be 
put back to work on extremely low wages. He would get no compensation, and 
therefore the accident cost for the employer would go down. . . .  The most seri- 
ous defect of merit rating,” Perkins emphasized to the president, “was the re- 
fusal to employ slightly handicapped people” (Perkins 1946, 290). 
In summary, the UI portions of the SSA were well thought out and crafted, 
a triumph of pragmatism to many and of economic reason to others. Yet it can 
also be claimed that there is much in the final bill that was accidental, a product 
of  the decade, of the people, of the Court, of the state bills that preceded it. 
That some of the features were eminently sensible for the time is clear from 
the historical record. In a 5-4  decision in 1937, the Supreme Court used the 
Florida v. Mellon precedent, just as Brandeis had predicted, to uphold the sec- 
tions of the 1935 SSA dealing with unemployment compensation.40  We know 
the act survived the Court, but how accurate were the framers concerning the 
impacts of the distinctive features? Merit rating, it was thought, would provide 
disincentives to unemployment, and the state system was touted as allowing 
UI to be tailored to the times and the place. 
7.2.3  1935 Social Security Act and Unemployment Compensation 
Better sense can be made of the impact of  UI legislation if the details are 
spelled out. Our task is simplified because the original act left so much to the 
states. As passed in 1935 Titles I11 and IX of  the SSA, those that dealt with 
unemployment compensation, called for a federal tax of  3 percent (by 1938, 
but beginning at 1 percent in 1936, rising to 2 percent in 1937) on all wages 
of employers of eight or more  States that subsequently passed their 
40. See National Conference of Social Welfare (1985) for the text of the Supreme Court opin- 
ions regarding the SSA, in particular Chas. C. StewardMachim Co.  v.  Davis (1937), which upheld 
the tax provisions for UI. 
41. Employer size was later changed to a minimum of four and eventually to one. State law, 
however, often mandated fewer employees than  the  federal minimum. In 1945, e.g., 16 states 
required UI for firms with one or more employees, whereas 22 retained the federally mandated 
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own UI legislation, approved by the Social Security Board, would receive a tax 
credit of 2.7 percent (0.9 of 3 percent), the 0.3 percent difference going to the 
federal government for overseeing the  States not passing a UI law 
would be ineligible to draw from the fund. The tax provided a strong incentive 
to pass UI legislation. Benefits could be paid out beginning in  1938, when it 
was believed the coffers would be full enough to cope with requests for com- 
pensation. 
The federal act mandated few items. It was up  to the states to determine 
benefits, duration, some aspects of  eligibility, and, after some point, the degree 
of merit rating and the tax structure. Each state had its own fund, managed by 
the U.S. Treasury. When state reserves reached 7.5 percent of  total covered 
wages the state could lower tax rates on some firms. Most important, the reduc- 
tion in the tax rate would be acceptable only if the state devised an approved 
experience-rated system to  penalize firms for unemployment. A  fully ex- 
perience-rated system would be akin to self-insurance by  each of  the firms, 
and  incomplete experience-rated systems-even  vastly  incomplete ones- 
could and did gain approval. Finally, the act implicitly disallowed the means 
testing of potential recipients.  Although the act is not explicit on means testing, 
it has been interpreted in this manner:) 
By mid-1937 all states had passed an approved UI law. Each was guided by 
a set of “draft bills” containing variants of the central aspects of the legislation 
(U.S. Social Security Board 1937). Experience rating, for example, could be 
calculated numerous ways,  and the draft bills outlined two possibilities for 
states adopting a pooled fund. One is now known as the reserve ratio approach, 
the most popular then and today, adopted by 29 states in 1948 and used by 33 
states in  1990. (We discuss experience rating and the reserve ratio concept 
below.) The other possibility was  general, giving states wide latitude. The 
benefit-wage method was adopted by nine states in 1948, although its popular- 
ity has since declined. The benefit-ratio method has become the second most 
popular system, although just three states chose it in 1948. Another draft bill 
was created for states that adopted individual employer reserve funds, as Wis- 
consin had done in 1932. Maximum and minimum benefit levels, eligibility, 
whether the accounts were pooled or firm-specific reserves, and other features 
42. The use of the tax credit and the state-based system were not the only aspects of the law 
governed by historical precedent. The administration of the funds was located in the U.S. Treasury 
Department and paid for with funds collected from employers by the federal government because 
of a perception that WC was improperly handled by  several states. The funds, moreover, are re- 
stricted to the payment of benefits and cannot be used for training, e.g. 
43. As noted above, means testing is implicitly covered in Sec. 907.g of the SSA. Among other 
aspects of the law are (1) nine states had employee contributions at the outset (Blaustein  1993, 
161) and (2) there was no federal taxable wage base stated in the act, although the base was $3,000 
for social security. A federal taxable wage base for UI was added in 1940. But unlike the case of 
social security, the federal taxable wage base for UI has substantially eroded over time. Whereas 
the (Federal Unemployment Tax Act tax basdtotal covered wages) was more than 90 percent in 
1940, it is less than 40  percent today (ACUC 1996). As a consequence, most states have taxable 
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of  the legislation differed from  state to  state in  the  initial legislation and 
evolved in ways that we have surveyed above. 
7.3  The Distinctive Features: Origin, Evolution, and Impact 
7.3.1  Experience Rating: The Most Distinctive Feature of 
Unemployment Insurance 
What Is Experience Rating and Why Was It Adopted? 
Of the three distinctive features of UI, two are easily understood in historical 
context. The state system was largely designed to ensure passage of the act in 
Congress and to avoid its rejection by the Supreme Court. Some claimed that 
the state system would also allow much-needed innovation through state exper- 
imentation. But the same factors that demanded the federal government penal- 
ize states for not passing UI  could lead them to race to the bottom when al- 
lowed  to  innovate.  The  limitation  of  benefits,  adopted by  all  states,  was 
prompted by the interwar lesson with unemployment in Britain. But what about 
the most distinctive aspect of U.S. unemployment insurance-its  experience 
or merit rating by firm?44 
Experience rating is defined as any tax system for UI in which firms encoun- 
tering a greater amount of compensated unemployment are taxed more heavily. 
In practice, however, there are a large number of  experience-rating systems 
that have been adopted by the various states. One of the most common is based 
on a construct called the “reserve ratio.” The reserve ratio is given by the differ- 
ence between taxes paid by the firm and benefits disbursed to its employees, 
all divided by the payroll of a firm. The ratio is defined over some time period, 
often that since the firm began experience rating. All systems have a maximum 
tax and a minimum tax (which can be zero). When the reserve ratio of a firm 
changes, due say to an increase in its layoffs, it will often be subject to a differ- 
ent tax. A higher reserve ratio will bring about a lower tax rate, and a lower 
reserve ratio a higher tax rate. But there can be “flats” in the schedule, so that 
a larger movement in the reserve ratio would be needed to change the tax rate. 
A schedule with a high minimum and a low maximum will have less com- 
plete experience rating than one with the reverse. Flats, in addition, cause 
bunching between reserve ratios and zero experience rating in that range. A 
completely experience-rated system would have a minimum rate of  zero and 
no maximum rate. It would penalize firms dollar for dollar with respect to 
benefits paid out to their workers. No systems have been completely experi- 
ence rated, with the possible exception of Wisconsin’s employer fund system 
as passed in  1932. All, therefore, are incompletely experience rated to some 
degree. 
44. It is interesting to speculate whether experience rating would have camed the day had Com- 
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The degree of  experience rating also depends on rules concerning what 
changes the tax rate. States governed by reserve ratios are the simplest to de- 
scribe and are the most numerous today and in the past. But there are other 
systems with considerably more complicated rules.45 
Experience rating was championed for two reasons. One was equity. Firms 
that created more unemployment should pay for it. Sectors, such as construc- 
tion, lumber, and food, that were inherently more seasonal should be taxed 
more heavily. The more complete the experience rating, the less would be the 
subsidy from low-unemployment to high-unemployment firms. The stabilizing 
effect of taxing layoffs furnished the other reason.46  Experience rating would 
tax unemployment and thus provide an incentive for firms to smooth produc- 
tion over the season and the cycle. 
The belief that seasonality was responsible for substantial unemployment 
motivated both reasons for experience rating. If  unemployment resulted in- 
stead from economic downturns, firms might have less control over employ- 
ment. And if unemployment were more stochastic than predictable, equity con- 
siderations would argue against experience rating. Thus, seasonality played a 
crucial role in the formulation of experience rating in UI.47 
In the discussion of experience rating, it was often claimed that because the 
45. See Anderson and Meyer (1993, 1994), Card and Levine (1994), and Topel (1983) for fuller 
discussions of measuring experience rating across different state systems. 
46. “Stabilization” can be interpreted  two ways.  First is the disincentive to lay off  workers. 
Second is the fiscal effect of increasing consumer demand when there was unemployment. It was 
the latter, macroeconomic,  reason that was foremost in the minds of  the drafters of  the SSA. 
According to Arthur Altmeyer, appointed chair of the Social Security Board in 1936, Roosevelt 
“stressed [the stabilization function of UI] in his initial meeting with Miss Perkins [secretary of 
labor], Dr. Witte [executive director of the Technical Board of the CES], and me in August 1934” 
(Altmeyer 1966, 25). Roosevelt also inserted a sentence in his message to Congress about the 
committee’s report, remarking that “federal legislation should not foreclose the States from estab- 
lishing means for inducing industries to afford an even greater stabilization of employment” (Alt- 
meyer 1966, 25). The message had been drafted by  Altmeyer, who took notice of the insertion. 
The addition appears to refer to experience rating. 
47. Douglas (Douglas and Director  1931) and Commons (Lewisohn et al. 1925) both contrib- 
uted to volumes on unemployment that contain virtually identical discussions of the role of season- 
ality and the attempts by firms to smooth production, often through advertising campaigns to entice 
consumers to purchase goods more regularly over the year. Both groups of authors emphasized 
the role and ability of private enterprise to smooth employment over the season. Despite these 
similarities, their conclusions  were often different. Commons and his coauthors argued for UI 
with employer-based experience rating to provide incentives for firms to further reduce seasonal 
unemployment. They recognized the role of cyclical downturns in causing unemployment, for they 
were writing in the wake of one of the worst economic downturns in American history. But, they 
noted, seasonal fluctuations were just as important, for virtually all industries “have busy and dull 
seasons which occur during practically the same month, year after year” (Lewisohn et al. 1925, 
83). They argued against employers who contended “that they do not need additional incentive 
unemployment insurance to cause them to stabilize employment” (213). Douglas, mustering simi- 
lar evidence and making similar points, concluded, contrary to Commons, that firms already had 
sufficient incentives to smooth employment and that the main function of unemployment compen- 
sation was its relief and stabilizing impact, which could be jeopardized by experience rating. Al- 
though, in his 1931 volume, Douglas did propose a UI plan with premium rates varying by unem- 
ployment, he downplayed the role of experience rating and opposed employer reserves. 247  Origins and Impact of US.  Unemployment Compensation 
United States was a more agriculturally based economy than most in Europe, 
its industry was more seasonal. Seasonality, according to many contemporar- 
ies, was at the root of  the unemployment problem in the United States, apart 
from vastly aberrant periods such as the Great Depression. 
In the 1930s, the debate over experience rating and the related subject of 
pooled versus individual firm accounts was highly contentious. Commons and 
his influential associates viewed experience rating as the crowning glory of the 
legislation, with the capacity to reduce future unemployment. Although Doug- 
las recognized the importance of seasonality, he believed, as we have already 
noted, that firms already had ample economic incentives to reduce its costs 
(Douglas and Director 1931)j8 
But did states with more seasonality embrace merit rating to encourage firms 
to reduce unemployment? Or, on the other hand, did states have incomplete 
experience rating to subsidize certain seasonal industrie~?~~  The latter question 
is not a simple one because the ability of  highly seasonal firms to extract a 
subsidy from less seasonal ones will depend on the lobbying strength of the 
more seasonal (and the lobbying weakness of  the less). The first matter is to 
describe seasonality in the pre-UI period across the United States. 
Seasonality before and after the Adoption of Unemployment Insurance 
There are many ways to capture the concept of seasonality. One is a simple 
peak-to-trough measure, by  month or by quarter. The measure captures what 
is generally meant by  seasonality, but it may miss fluctuations over the year. 
Another, and the one we will mainly rely on, captures the choppiness in the 
data and is the standard deviation of  monthly employment growth rates (see 
Barsky and Miron 1989).50 
We  measure seasonality in manufacturing across states before and after UI. 
For the pre-UI period, we  are able to use four years of manufacturing data 
(1909, 1914, 1919, and 1929), and for the post-UI period we use annual Bu- 
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS) establishment survey data for the 1949-69  pe- 
The major difference between the pre- and post-UI data is that the pre- 
48. Experience rating remains a controversial issue. The recent ACUC report  (1 996) failed to 
reach a consensus on whether to weaken or strengthen experience rating. The argument for experi- 
ence rating remains that of Commons. The argument against is that experience rating creates an 
adversarial system in which firms contest workers’ UI claims and that it creates an incentive for 
firms to use contingent workers who would not qualify for UI benefits. 
49. See Adams (1986) for evidence to this effect for the 1970s. 
50. More precisely, this measure of seasonality is the standard deviation of coefficient estimates 
on month dummies in a regression for each state, where the monthly change in log employment 
is regressed on a full set of month dummies. There are 11 monthly changes; that from December 
to January is not observable in the 1909-29 period because our data are for the census years 1909, 
1914, 1919, and 1929. 
5  1. The 1909-29  data are from the US.  census of manufactures (construction data were not 
collected until  1929) and give employment of  wage earners  (meaning production workers) by 
month (US. Bureau of the Census 1933b). The data for 1949-69  are from the U.S. Department 
of Labor, BLS LABSTAT database maintained on the Internet at http://stats.bls.gov and include 
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Fig. 7.5  Seasonality, 1909-29 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1933b). 
Nores: The seasonality measure is the standard deviation of the monthly employment growth rate 
by state for the years 1904, 1909, 1919, and 1929. The numbers in the legend have been multiplied 
by  1,OOO. The ranges were chosen to divide the 48  states into four equal groups. 
UI data contain only production workers whereas the post-U1 data contain all 
employees in manufacturing. To account for the difference in coverage we mul- 
tiply the 1949-69  state seasonality estimates by a factor of l .31, the estimated 
ratio in those years of the seasonality of production to all manufacturing work- 
ers at the national level. The adjustment factor implicitly assumes that each 
state’s  seasonality was affected to the same degree as was the nation’s.52  If 
correct, we are comparing seasonality in the pre- and post-UI periods for pro- 
duction workers in manufacturing. 
The data for this measure of seasonality are given in the maps of  figures 7.5 
and 7.6, the ranges of which are the same to facilitate comparison. The greatest 
seasonality before 1929 was found in the Pacific, Mountain, and Plains states; 
the least in New England (except Maine), the Middle Atlantic, and parts of 
the South. States with more diversified manufacturing show less seasonality, 
possibly why much of  Europe may have had less seasonal employment than 
did the American states. States with cold, harsh climates, not surprisingly, had 
52. Another difference is that the pre-1930 manufacturing data include railroad repair shops. 
We can subtract this sector only for 1929. Railroad repair was less seasonal than the rest of  manu- 
facturing and will bias the results against a reduction in seasonality especially in the small west- 
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Fig. 7.6  Seasonality, 1949-69 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, BLS LABSTAT. 
Nures: The seasonality measure is the standard deviation of the monthly employment growth rate 
by state for all years between 1949 and 1969. The numbers in the legend have been multiplied by 
1,OOO.  The ranges were chosen to divide the 48 states into four equal groups in 1909-29  (see 
fig. 7.5). 
more seasonality, as did those with greater dependence on the food (SIC 20) 
and timber (SIC 24) industries. 
In comparison with pre-1929 seasonality, that for the 1949-69 period is con- 
siderably lower.53  The  (unweighted) mean  of  our seasonality measure de- 
creases from 0.0254 in  1909-29  to 0.0182 in  1949-69  (after applying our 
correction factor), about a one-third decline.54  Not only did the mean of  sea- 
sonality decline in the post-World  War I1 era, its distribution changed. With 
few exceptions, seasonality in the post-World  War  I1 period increases uni- 
formly when moving from east to west, whereas the geographic pattern in the 
pre- 1929 period is considerably more mixed. 
Some states shifted position between the periods. As seen in figure 7.7, Con- 
53. For a discussion of seasonality around the turn of the century, see Engerman and Goldin 
(1993). 
54. We compute similar changes for another measure, the log (maximum quarterlylminimum 
quarterly) employment. The (unweighted) mean for “quarterly” seasonality for 1909-29  is 8.65 
log points but 5.49 for 1949-69. These figures are unadjusted for differences in employment cov- 
erage. 
National monthly data on production worker employment in manufacturing are available from 
the BLS starting in 1919. The standard deviation of monthly log employment growth rates, for the 
entire nation, declined from 0.0105 for 1919-29  to 0.0091 for 1949-69. 250  Katherine Baicker, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F.  Katz 
Change in Seasonality 
1909l29 to 1949169 
Fig. 7.7  Change in seasonality, 1909-29  to 1949-69 
Sources: See figs. 7.5 and 7.6. 
Nores: The change in seasonality is the value for 1909-29  minus that for 1949-69;  thus negative 
values are increases in seasonality, and positive values are decreases. The numbers in the legend 
have been multiplied by  1,OOO. 
necticut, Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming 
(darkest shading)  actually became  more  seasonal. But  considerably more 
states became less seasonal. Leading the list are Arkansas, California, Colo- 
rado, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Utah, Virginia, 
and Washington (cross-hatching),  all having among the greatest seasonality in 
the 1909-29 period. Fully 30 states had decreases in seasonality over the years 
we  cover. Some of  the declines, as in the South, stemmed from the growth 
of  more diversified manufacturing. States with the most  seasonality in  the 
1909-29  period generally had the smallest fraction of  their employment in 
manufacturing (and construction). But there were exceptions, such as the states 
of the Pacific region, for which seasonality was extremely high and seasonal 
industries were a nontrivial fraction of total employment. Also Maryland, Del- 
aware, Maine and some parts of the Midwest had considerable seasonality of 
employment and a high fraction of manufacturing and construction workers in 
total employment. 
Seasonality, therefore, was  substantial prior to the passage of  UI and de- 
clined subsequently. We  now address whether pre-UI seasonality affected the 
evolution of state laws and also whether experience rating by state had an effect 
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7.3.2 
Evolution of BeneJits 
The federal-state structure of  UI allowed it to evolve differently across the 
various states. Such differences could emerge for reasons of efficiency or in- 
stead  could  reflect  diverse  lobbying  interests  and  power.  We  investigate 
whether states with more seasonality in the predepression period were those 
that evolved relatively high benefits. Firms and workers in the more seasonal 
industries should have been the most interested in generous benefits (and low 
experience rating). But their ability to achieve high benefits will be greater 
when they are not too large a share of the labor force, because the more sea- 
sonal industries will want to use the UI system to transfer resources from less 
seasonal industries. As long as experience rating is not perfect, more seasonal 
industries are almost always subsidized by less seasonal ones.55 
We regress various measures of the average level of state benefits from 1947 
to  1969 on (1) seasonality in manufacturing employment for 1909-29  (also 
construction in 1929), (2) the proportion of the state labor force in manufactur- 
ing and construction in 1930, and (3) an interaction of the seasonality and labor 
force proportion measures.56  The key independent variables were determined 
30 to 50 years prior to the dependent variables. 
Six regressions are offered to demonstrate the range of results with different 
functional forms and specifications. Columns (1) and (5) use the log of  the 
average replacement rate, whereas column (2) uses log (maximum benefits/ 
average weekly wage). An advantage of examining the determinants of maxi- 
mum weekly benefits is that they are directly set by state legislatures. Columns 
(3), (4), and (6) loosen the constraint on the log (average weekly wage) coeffi- 
cient and include it as a separate variable. Finally, in column (6), we add the 
logarithm of per capita income and the percentage unionized in the state. 
The results, given in  table 7.1, are striking and  suggestive. Benefits are 
higher the greater the seasonality in manufacturing employment in  1929, as 
long as the percentage in manufacturing and construction is below 30 percent 
(using col. [l]), just above the (unweighted) state mean in  1930 (25.5 per- 
cent).57  And benefits are higher the greater the percentage in manufacturing 
and construction, as long as the seasonality measure is below 0.0213 (using 
Distinctive Features: Evolution and Impact 
55. Many employees in highly seasonal industries are not subject to effective marginal experi- 
ence rating in any state because their firms are already at the maximum tax rate. 
56. We  use the ratio of  the average benefit to the average weekly wage in the state. The true 
after-tax replacement rate would be higher because UI benefits were not taxed during this time 
period. See ACUC (1996) for a discussion of alternative measures of  replacement ratios. 
57. If, e.g., seasonality increases by  1 standard deviation (a change of 0.0183) and if the propor- 
tion in manufacturing is 0.151 (1 standard deviation below the mean), then the impact will be to 
increase in the replacement rate by 9 percent (using the col. [1] results). Note that the construction 
seasonality results (col. [5]) also show that increasing seasonality in construction increases bene- 
fits but only if the share of the labor force in manufacturing and construction is below the mean 
in  1930. Table 7.1  Explaining Unemployment Benefits by State, 194769 
Variable 
log (average weekly  log (maximum  log (average  log (maximum  log (average weekly  log (average 
weekly benefits)  benefitdwage)  benefitdwage)  weekly benefits)  benefits)  benefi ts/wage) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Seasonality in manufacturing, 
Proportion in (manufacturing 
Seasonality in manufacturing 
1909-29 
+ construction), 1930 









Mean log (average weekly 
Seasonality in construction, 
Seasonality in construction X 
Log (per capita income), 
Percentage unionized, 1939 
10.1  7.45  10.0 
(2.18)  (2.98)  (2.20) 
0.725  0.499  0.75 1 
(0.186)  (0.255)  (0.193) 
-  -34.0  -25.5  -33.3 








































-  1.33  -  1.07  -0.243  -0.232  -  1.48  -1.19 




0.125  0.741  0.485  0.453 
0.106  0.0781  0.0838  0.0717 




Sources and Notes: Regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. The continental 48 states are included. The seasonality measure is the standard deviation 
of monthly employment growth rates and is described in the text. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Dependent variables: 
Cols. (I) and (5)  log (average benefitdwage): State mean of log (average state weekly benefitslaverage state weekly wage) for 1947-69;  U.S. Department of Labor, 
Employment and Training Administration (ETA 1996). 
Col. (2) log (maximum benefitdwage): State mean of log (maximum state weekly benefits/average state weekly wage) for the 12 years from 1947-69 for which we 
have data; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Economic Security (BES, various years). Maximum weekly benefits are for a worker with no dependents. 
Cols. (3) and (6)  log (average weekly benefits): Coefficients on state dummy variables in a regression of log (average weekly benefits) on a full set of year and state 
dummies using state-by-year data covering 1947-69. 
Col. (4) log (maximum benefits): Coefficients on state dummy variables in a regression of log (maximum benefits) on a full set of year and state dummies for state- 
by-year data covering the 12 years from 1947-69  for which we have data. 
Independent variables: 
Seasonality in manufacturing, 1909-29:  Monthly data for manufacturing during 1909-29  from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1933b). 
Proportion in (manufacturing + construction), 1930: Proportion of the state’s labor force in manufacturing and construction, US.  Bureau of the Census (1932). 
Seasonality in construction, 1929: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1933a). 
Mean log (average weekly wage), 1947-69:  Coefficient on state dummies in a regression of log (average weekly wage) on a full set of year and state dummies for 
state-by-year data covering 1947-69. Average weekly wage data from US. Department of Labor, ETA (1996). 
Log (per capita income), 1929: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 1984, table 2). 
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col. [ll), approximately the (unweighted) mean in  1909-29  (0.0253). States 
with more seasonal industries in the pre-UI period had higher benefits, as a 
fraction of  wages, in the post-UI period but only if  their manufacturing and 
construction sectors were not overly large in relation to total state employment. 
Seasonality in the construction industry, moreover, has an added effect and 
operates similar to the way  overall seasonality in manufacturing does. When 
seasonality is high, benefits are higher, as long as the proportion of the state’s 
labor force in the combined manufacturing and construction sector is not too 
high. State per capita income enters positively, but unionization is weakly neg- 
ative. 
Our findings suggest a political economy story of  successful lobbying ef- 
forts by  highly seasonal industries. Generosity has its limits, however. Lob- 
bying is more effective when the costs can be spread over a sufficiently wide 
group of industries and workers. 
Impact of Experience Rating 
The most distinctive feature of UI-experience  rating-is  embedded in var- 
ious aspects of  state UI laws. States were given an incentive by  Title IX of 
the act to adopt some form of experience rating, although many had already 
incorporated merit rating in their UI laws. When reserves reached 7.5 percent 
of total payroll, a state could reduce the tax rates of some firms below the 2.7 
percent rate set by  law only if  it adopted an approved form of  experience 
rating.58 
The tax schedules incorporating experience rating and the type of  reserve 
system used evolved over time. The schedules are complex, often containing 
many flat portions, and it is difficult to construct useful summary measures of 
them. In assessing whether a firm  will pay  more if  it lays off a worker, one 
must know the tax schedule facing the firm and where the firm is on it.59  These 
statistics are difficult to obtain today, and we have nothing resembling them for 
the past. We  use, instead, an admittedly crude state-level measure of experi- 
ence rating to assess its long-run impact on seasonality. 
The measure is the “slope” of the schedule, which can be defined only for 
the 3 1 states adopting the reserve ratio basis. It is given by (maximum -  mini- 
mum tax rate)/(reserve ratio at minimum -  reserve ratio at maximum tax rate). 
It is a measure of the degree to which firms are taxed for an additional layoff 
when they are between the minimum and maximum tax rates. We use the mea- 
sure to crudely assess whether the adoption of experience rating by  states had 
some effect on the change in seasonality that we have just illustrated. 
The effect of UI on layoffs has been a subject of wide-ranging interest, for 
it addresses a central question about the economic effects of  public policy. 
58. This rapidly happened as unemployment plummeted in the early 1940s. 
59. Anderson and Meyer (1993, 1994) show that experience-rating systems are extremely com- 
plicated and that there is considerable heterogeneity in the marginal tax cost of layoffs facing firms 
even within a single state system and a single industry. 255  Origins and Impact of U.S.  Unemployment Compensation 
Does UI encourage more layoffs because firms do not bear their full costs? 
Most researchers find, mainly for the post-1970s period, that incomplete expe- 
rience rating increases layoffs, heightens seasonality, and shifts employment to 
more seasonal sectors. It is ironic, though, from the standpoint of our paper, 
that so much emphasis has been placed on incomplete experience rating when 
the most distinctive, and possibly most interesting, aspect of the U.S.  unem- 
ployment insurance system is the presence of experience rating in any form. 
Anderson and Meyer (1994), Card  and Levine (1994), Feldstein (1976, 
1978),  and Topel (1983,1985) all argue that imperfect experience rating leads 
to excessive cyclical and seasonal layoffs."  In a study of the retail trade indus- 
try, Anderson (1993) finds that higher UI taxes reduce seasonal variation in 
employment, mainly during the Christmas boom, and raise the average level 
of  employment in the retail trade industry.61  Deere (1991) contends that the 
current imperfectly experience-rated UI system subsidizes unstable sectors 
and industries and thereby serves to expand their employment.62 
Not  only does UI  involve cross-subsidization, but Anderson and Meyer 
( 1993)  also provide convincing evidence that the system has persistently subsi- 
dized the same firms and ind~stries.~~  Thus, they argue that UI is less a system 
of insurance than of subsidies to unstable sectors and their workers. The subsi- 
dization, moreover, could originate in the political strength of unstable firms, 
industries, and their unionized workforces, as persuasively argued by Adams 
(1986). 
Rather than ask what impact incomplete experience rating has had, we in- 
quire instead as to its impact on changes in seasonality. We  employ two main 
tests, both admittedly imprecise due to data deficiencies for the long period we 
are exploring. 
One test is to see whether the marked change in seasonality we  demon- 
strated above is related to the extent and completeness of experience rating 
across the various states. Our primary dependent variable is the difference, 
between  1909-29  and 1949-69,  in one of  our measures of  seasonality (the 
standard deviation of monthly employment growth rates). The measure of ex- 
perience rating is the slope of the tax function in reserve ratio states averaged 
over 12 years in the 195  1-69  period. The slope is the change in the UI tax rate 
60. Anderson and Meyer (1994) show that conclusions from analyses using industry-state data 
may be misleading but reach similar conclusions using firm-level data. Feldstein (1978),  Topel 
(1983), and Card and Levine (1994), using Current Population Survey data matched to information 
on state UI laws and the individual's industry of employment, find that greater UI subsidies and 
lower experience rating are associated with more unemployment as the result of temporary layoffs. 
Temporary layoffs seem more sensitive to experience rating than are permanent layoffs. 
61. Similarly, Halpin (1979) concludes that stronger experience rating reduced seasonal fluctu- 
ations in the employment of two highly seasonal industries during the 1960s and early 1970s (but 
not in a third). 
62. But Iorio (1987) argues that, in a world of incomplete capital markets, imperfect experience 
rating provides insurance to riskier industries and allows their workers to  smooth consumption 
(see Gruber 1994 for evidence on consumption smoothing). 
63. Meyer and Rosenbaum (1996) find the same result for workers. 256  Katherine Baicker, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F.  Katz 
with a change in the reserve ratio and can be thought of as the degree to which 
an increase in unemployment increases a firm’s taxes, within the minimum and 
maximum rates.64  We  also use an experience-rating  measure devised by Deere 
(1991), the “subsidy” to firms in a state, measured as the present discounted 
value of  the difference between UI benefits received and the increase in UI 
taxes owed as the result of an additional layoff. 
Because of the necessity of using only reserve ratio states, we have just 3 1 
(sometimes 30) observations, and outliers can dominate the analysis. Figure 
7.8 shows the scatterplots  for manufacturing and construction. In the manufac- 
turing sample California is a notable outlier, as is Nevada in the construction 
sample. Thus, we present both ordinary least squares (OLS) and median re- 
gression estimates in table 7.2. 
As is shown in table 7.2, the median regressions provide modest evidence 
of a negative impact of experience rating on long-run trends in ~easonality.~~ 
The high-low seasonality measure is more significant than is the measure em- 
ploying the standard deviation of  employment growth rates, and the coeffi- 
cients using construction data are more significant than are those for manufac- 
turing. In all cases, however, the coefficients are economically significant. An 
increase in experience rating of  1 standard deviation (0.165) decreases manu- 
facturing seasonality by -0.00505,  or about 0.5 standard deviations. Our evi- 
dence, therefore, is consistent with the microlevel data we  cited above, but 
given the nonlinearity and complexity of  the tax rate schedules, it must be 
interpreted with caution. 
A second test uses the natural experiment of two different UI systems just a 
border apart. Canada and the United States introduced UI systems at nearly 
the same time. That in the United States began paying out benefits in  1938; 
Canada’s system did in 1942. The systems were initially of similar generosity 
regarding benefits, duration, and coverage and remained so until the early 
1970s.  The major difference is that the U.S. system is experience rated whereas 
Canada’s is not. To the extent that experience rating was effective, the United 
States should have undergone more stabilization  of seasonal employment fluc- 
tuations than did Canada from the pre-UI to the post-UI periods. 
To examine the hypothesis, we make some, admittedly crude, comparisons 
of changes in seasonal employment fluctuations in construction and manufac- 
turing for Canada (as an aggregate) and for U.S. states on or close to the Cana- 
dian border. We use border states to control for other trends in seasonality that 
ought to be common to states and provinces with similar climates and, possi- 
bly, industrial structures. 
We  aggregate monthly employment for 13 U.S. states (from west to east: 
64. We ignore flats in the schedule and are aware of all the problems we previously mentioned 
that are  raised in Anderson and Meyer (1994). Our  slope measure is a simplification of  the ap- 
proach to measuring experience rating used by Brechling (1981). 
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Scatterplots of change in seasonality and  experience rating slope by 
state: A, manufacturing, 1909-29  to 194949; B, construction, 1929 to 1949-69 
Sources and Notes:  The measure of seasonality is the standard deviation of the monthly employ- 
ment growth  rate. “Slope” is defined in the text and is computed for 1951-69.  See table 7.2 notes 
for seasonality and “slope” sources. Table 7.2  Explaining Changes in Seasonality, 1920-29  to 1949-69 
Seasonality measure: 
Estimation technique: 
Manufacturing  Construction 
S.D. Measure  S.D. Measure  High-Low  S.D. Measure  S.D. Measure  S.D. Measure 
OLS  Median Regression  Median Regression  OLS  OLS  Median Regression 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
~~~  ~ 
Experience-rating measure,  -0.0147  -0.0305  -0.0875  -0.0786  -0.148 
UI subsidy, 1962-69  ( 1967 
Constant  0.000 197  0.0025  I  0.00399  -0.0107  -0.0693  -0.0389 
slope, 195  1-69  (0.01  14)  (0.0173)  (0.01  67)  (0.0529)  (0.0621) 
dollars) X  (0.0582) 
0.0993 
(0.000429)  (0.00359)  (0.00694)  (0.00422)  (0.0200)  (0.0232) 
R’  or pseudo R’  0.0547  0.0274  0.126  0.0972  0.0706  0.09.56 
Root MSE  0.0103  0.00867  0.0479 
N  31  31  31  29  31  31 
Mean of  dependent variable  -0.0048  I  -0.00481  -  O.OOS06  -0.00402  -0.0960  -0.0960 
Sources and Notes: 
Dependent variables: 
Cols. (I), (2),  and (4) use the s.d. measure that is the change in the standard deviation in mean monthly employment growth rates for manufacturing from 
Col. (3) uses the high-low measure, which is the difference between the log of employment in the highest and lowest quarters. 
Col. (5) and (6) uses the s.d. measure for construction from 1929 to 1949-69. 
Independent variables: 
Experience-rating measure, slope: US.  Department of Labor, BES (various years): 
where maxtax = maximum UI tax  rate (including firms with negative balances); mintax  minimum UI tax  rate; rnaxres = maximum reserve ratio on 
“sloped’ part of  tax schedule, which equals the lowest reserve ratio associated with mintax; minres = lowest reserve ratio on the “sloped’ part of the tax 
schedule, which equals highest reserve ratio associated with rnaxtax. 
UI subsidy, 1962-69:  private communication from Donald Deere; see Deere (1991). 
Col. (4) deletes California, which is an outlier. The coefficient of the U1 subsidy variable is 0.0537 with a standard error of  0.0694 if California is included. 
Numbers in  parentheses are standard errors. 
1909-29  to 1949-69. 
slope = (maxtax  ~  mintax)/(maxres -  minres), 259  Origins and Impact of US. Unemployment Compensation 
Table 7.3  Seasonality in US. and Canadian Industry, Pre-UI to Post-UI 
Standard Deviation of Monthly Employment Growth Rates 
Pre-UI: 1929  Post-UI: 1947-63  Post -  Pre, (2) -  (1) 











Canada  0.0268  0.0123  -0.0145 
United States  0.0237  0.0079  -0.0158 
[  -0.01 341  [O.O I03  J 
Sources and Notes: 
United States refers to the 13 states that are on or close to the Canadian border (from west to east: 
Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylva- 
nia, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine). 
U.S. pre-UI manufacturing employment by month: U.S.  Bureau of the Census (1933b). 
U.S. pre-UI construction employment by month: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1933a). 
U.S.  post-UI  manufacturing,  construction  employment  by  month: Department  of  Labor, BLS 
LABSTAT database maintained on the Internet at http://stats.bls.gov. 
Canadian pre-UI manufacturing, construction employment by month: Canada, Dominion Bureau 
of Statistics (1963). 
Canadian post-UI manufacturing, construction employment by month: Canada, Dominion Bureau 
of Statistics (1955-64). 
Standard deviation of monthly employment growth rates: see text. 
Figures in brackets adjust for differences in the coverage of the US.  data between in the pre- and 
post-UI periods. The pre-UI period covers production workers only, whereas the post-UI period 
covers all employees. The adjustment, derived from national data for the post-UI period on both 
groups, produces a ratio of seasonality for production workers to all employees equal to 1.3  1. Thus 
the figures in brackets adjust the post-UI data to approximate the coverage in the pre-UI period. 
Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine) to cre- 
ate a comparison group and use two measures of employment. One compares 
construction in 1929 (the only pre-UI year for the U.S. data) with that in the 
1947-63  post-UI period. The other looks at manufacturing in 1929 (the only 
pre-UI year for which we have both U.S. state-level and Canadian monthly 
employment data in manufacturing) versus that in 1947-63. 
The results of these comparisons are shown in table 7.3. A larger reduction 
in seasonality in construction is found for the U.S. border states than for Can- 
ada (col. [3]), consistent with there being an impact of experience rating. The 
difference in manufacturing is less pronounced.66  Thus the bulk of our cross- 
66. When we correct for differences in employment coverage in the pre- and post-UI U.S. data 
we get a smaller reduction in seasonality (in comparison with Canada) and a larger reduction if 
we do not use the correction factor. We are uncertain whether the correction factor is appropriate, 
given possible changes in employment coverage in the Canadian data. 260  Katherine Baicker, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F.  Katz 
state and cross-country analysis suggests that experience rating served to re- 
duce employment fluctuations in highly seasonal industries. 
7.4  Concluding Remarks 
The UI system in the United States was established in a period of extreme 
and pervasive unemployment to be a program for ordinary times. The system 
could not have coped for long with the extent and duration of unemployment 
in the decade in which it was created. Its functions have changed little since its 
creation and an important question is whether UI is a program for the more 
ordinary times of today. 
In the 60 years since its creation, UI has served a multitude of functions. Its 
limited benefits have, or so many believe, shielded the United States from the 
high unemployment experienced in Europe in response to negative employ- 
ment shocks. Although some emphasize the incomplete nature of experience 
rating in the U.S. system, it is far closer to a perfect merit system than is any 
other, and many have demonstrated the benefits of experience rating for low- 
ering unemployment and seasonality. 
The main criticism of the current UI system is that it has not changed with 
the times. The federal-state system set up in 1935 to find a way  around the 
Supreme Court was ingenious. But it may  later have produced a race to the 
bottom. In comparison with other OECD countries, the U.S. unemployment 
insurance system has low generosity, and its eligibility rates have declined 
markedly since the 1960s. The original act stated that UI monies could be used 
only to fund benefits and program administration. But there are many who 
today believe that UI needs to add reemployment and retraining to its func- 
tions. 
We  have described the origins of  the distinctive features of the unemploy- 
ment compensation system adopted in August 1935 as part of  the omnibus 
SSA. Of greatest importance are its federal-state structure, experience rating, 
and the limitation of  benefits imposed by  all states. We  addressed how the 
parameters of the UI system evolved at the state level and the impact experi- 
ence rating has had on the seasonality of employment. Evidence was presented 
showing that more seasonality in manufacturing employment in 1909-29  is 
related to higher UI benefits from 1947 to 1969 if a state’s manufacturing em- 
ployment share is below the national mean. Lobbying activities of seasonal 
industries appear important in the evolution of the parameters. We  also pre- 
sented suggestive evidence that there is a relationship between declining sea- 
sonality and experience rating. 
Had there been no Great Depression, it is likely that UI would have been 
passed at some future date. The bill, we believe, would have been closer to the 
one that Paul Douglas, Frances Perkins, and others in the Roosevelt adminis- 
tration favored-strictly  national in scope. Without the federal-state structure, 
it likely that it would not have incorporated experience rating, although we are 261  Origins and Impact of U.S. Unemployment Compensation 
less certain of that. Compromises had to be made by those who championed a 
national UI system in the exacting and uncertain 1930s.  The federal-state struc- 
ture and the manner in which the states were induced to adopt their own UI 
legislation assured passage of the act and guaranteed its constitutionality.  As is 
the case with other pieces of  New Deal legislation, the legacy of  the 1930s 
lives on. 
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